Two major reports criticize UCLA for police, violence at pro-Palestinian protest

Two high-profile, back-to-back reports criticize UCLA leaders for a botched breakdown of its police response that led to violence at a pro-Palestinian camp in April, with an investigation also highlighting the “failures dramatic actions of the university in combating anti-Semitism”.

A draft report to the Los Angeles Police Commission released Friday cited a lack of coordination between UCLA, the LAPD and the California Highway Patrol and smaller municipal police agencies that were rushed to the campus in the spring.

UCLA, which has its own police force, distanced itself from relying on the LAPD following the Black Lives Matter protests four years ago, a practice that contributed to the poorly coordinated response, the report suggests. Some teams of arriving officers didn’t even know their way around the sprawling campus and were given conflicting orders about what to do as the melee unfolded before them for hours on the night of April 30.

The LAPD should take over campus law enforcement before future “large-scale events” if university staffing is not adequate, the report said.

The report to the commission, the civilian agency tasked with overseeing the LAPD, came in the wake of a congressional investigation that slammed the university for allowing anti-Semitism to fester on campus during pro-Palestinian protests.

The Republican-led US Education and Workforce Commission criticized UCLA and other elite universities, including Harvard and Columbia, for “dramatic failures to combat anti-Semitism.” The report — which was based on emails between UCLA police, UCLA administrators, UC President Michael V. Drake and UC Regents — followed explosive committee hearings over the past year that contributed to the resignations of presidents at Harvard, Columbia, Rutgers and the University from Pennsylvania. .

In a statement, UCLA Associate Vice Chancellor for Campus Safety Rick Braziel said the findings and recommendations sent to the police commission are under review.

“In the meantime, both UCLA and the University of California Office of the President are conducting separate reviews of the events that occurred last spring, and UCLA has already implemented a number of measures to improve campus safety,” Braziel said.

In a separate university statement on the congressional report, UCLA said it was “committed to combating anti-Semitism and fostering an environment in which every member of our community feels safe and welcome.” We learned valuable lessons from the events of last spring and, before the start of this academic year, instituted reforms and programs to combat discrimination and enhance campus safety.”

In August, Drake led the chancellors of all 10 campuses to strictly enforce the rules against encampments, protests blocking roads and masking covering identities amid sharp calls to stop policy violations during demonstrations.

Early signs of trouble

The combined narrative of both reports provides the most detailed timeline of events leading up to the night of violence that began on April 30, with repercussions stretching back to May 2, when a massive police sweep of the camp resulted in more than 200 arrests and six police uses. force.

In a UCLA police message thread on April 25, five days before the violence, a patrol officer suggested that police identify and remove non-UCLA students, staff and faculty from the newly formed encampment on Royce Quad from the center of campus, the House Report said. An unidentified person replied that UCLA had decided to “hold back.”

Around 5 a.m. on April 25, UCLA Police Chief John Thomas texted LAPD Commanders Steve Lurie and Jonathan Tom to inform them that several tents had been set up on campus and that UCLA “would may require assistance as the day progresses,” said the police commission report, prepared by the LAPD and submitted to the commission by Acting Police Chief Dominic H. Choi. The panel could approve it as early as its next meeting on Tuesday.

On April 25, a UCLA police lieutenant informed the then UCLA police chief that more than 50 unidentified people were unloading firewood, tents and other materials from the truck at Royce Quad. UCLA closed a nearby street to prevent further access, but tenting by Royce Quad and Powell Library continued, the House committee report said.

The camp grew to more than 150 people with tents surrounded by wood pellets, with university firefighters warning against the use of wood, the House committee report said.

“Over the course of the next day, it became apparent to UCPD and campus administrators that the university was understaffed,” according to the House report, which largely summarized the university’s emails.

“UCLA leaders worried that they would not be able to restrict access to the area or prevent further expansion of the camp without a significant increase in manpower, with one senior administrator warning that ‘no amount of temporary fencing will keep these people out.’ ,” the House report said.

On April 27, Choi approved the deployment of two LAPD mobile response teams to the campus to stand by. Thomas told Choi that Beverly Hills, Culver City and Santa Monica were sending teams and that the LAPD would be the last resort.

The next morning, Thomas wrote in a group chat with other law enforcement leaders that more pro-Palestinian protesters planned to march on campus. Minutes later, an LAPD lieutenant texted colleagues to say UCLA “has no plans” to release the protesters, the report said.

By 10:30 a.m., more than 1,000 pro-Israel counter-protesters had arrived at the camp.

That morning, a single West LA squad car was dispatched to monitor the protest. By 10:41 a.m., police began receiving reports that protesters and counter-protesters were “getting physical.”

Other LAPD officers were dispatched to the campus. Around 11:14 a.m., the LAPD lieutenant texted Lurie to say that UCLA had requested the LAPD’s help in removing the protesters. But he responded that the LAPD would not participate in the arrests.

Around 1:34 p.m., Lurie sent a text message to a group of senior LAPD personnel to inform them that the pro-Israel protest crowd was thinning and UCLA administrators were discussing how and when to clear the encampment. Choi responded that the LAPD would not be involved in cleaning up the area. About 90% of the pro-Israel group left within an hour.

There were more moments of tension over the next two days as coordination with the LAPD showed signs of disjunction, the report to the police commission said.

It exploded on the night of April 30.

As reports of clashes began to trickle in, UCLA police leaders contacted Lurie to let him know that campus police were being overwhelmed by the crowd.

While the initial message was sent at 11:07 p.m., campus police officials did not make a formal request for mutual aid until 11:31 p.m. and again 10 minutes later, the commission report said. The first LAPD units arrived on campus at 12:12 p.m. Around 1:45 a.m., several mobile response teams entered the melee to try to separate protesters and counter-protesters who had converged near a flagpole.

But they “took no further action to clear the crowds” as they were still formulating a plan and awaiting support, the commission’s report said. According to department crowd control rules, officers are supposed to wait for “sufficient personnel” before entering a crowd to make arrests. It was at least another hour before CHP officers began clearing the rest of the yard near the camp. By 3:48 a.m., the area had been cleared, although the camp remained.

By the following night, multiple law enforcement agencies participated in clearing the camp with over 200 arrests.

The report to the commission recommended that the UCPD, LAPD and other police agencies “establish procedures” for who is in control when primary jurisdiction officers are “overwhelmed,” as was the case at UCLA. It says combining different agencies can be “problematic” because of “varied use-of-force policies and tactics”.

He also said that LAPD officers should coordinate better with UCLA so they are more aware of how to navigate the campus, and that the LAPD should improve its record-keeping and training to improve its response to similar protests future

The protests fueled anti-Semitism

The House committee’s findings accuse UCLA of largely ignoring the growing camp, while it was aware as early as April 27 of allegations of anti-Semitic language on campus or acts stemming from it.

Chaired by Rep. Virginia Foxx (RN.C.), the panel has been accused of bias. Democrats, who make up 20 of the committee’s 44 members, have criticized Republicans for not being serious in their pursuit of combating anti-Semitism. Members of the House minority called the hearings an attempt by House Republicans to use the unrest on campus for political gain, noting that equal attention has not been given to anti-Muslim or anti-Arab hatred, which has also grown since October. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel.

In the spring, the committee questioned former UCLA Chancellor Gene Block along with the presidents of Northwestern and Rutgers, but Block’s questions about the violence at UCLA came mostly from Democrats.

USC escapes harsh criticism

Separately on Friday, the Los Angeles Police Commission also released a report on USC, where the LAPD arrested 94 people on April 24 as campus police and security officers cleared a pro-Palestinian camp in Alumni Park.

That report, which is significantly shorter than UCLA’s, was less critical. USC did not respond to a request for comment on the finding, which said the LAPD deployed 619 officers to campus over three days between April 24 and May 5. The report’s recommendations include that police do a better job of “tracking staff” to estimate costs and more closely monitor use-of-force reporting procedures.

Police used force twice at USC. In one, an LAPD officer fired a 40 mm round at a protester, and in the other, an officer used his baton. None of the incidents resulted in injuries, the report said. But, the cases were not investigated immediately, as required by department policy, because of the department’s reliance on paper records.