Wary of Japan’s ‘Asian NATO’ proposal, neighboring countries stick with network of alternatives to deter China

Italian Navy Italian-French European Multimission Frigate (FREMM ) Alpino (F594) arrives at Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Yokosuka Naval Base in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, Thursday, Aug. 22, 2024. Photo by Keizo Mori/UPI

Italian Navy Italian-French European Multimission Frigate (FREMM ) Alpino (F594) arrives at the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Yokosuka Naval Base in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, Thursday, Aug. 22, 2024. Photo by Keizo Mori/ UPI | Licensed photo

Oct. 25 (UPI) — Japan In the run-up to his election, the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba floated the idea of an “Asian NATO” to deter China’s growing aggression in the Asia-Pacific region. The prospect of establishing an alliance in the Asia-Pacific region similar to the collective defense promised by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is hindered by the reality that few, if any, countries are willing to commit to the collective defense of an area where a nuclear nation is already actively testing the limits of its power.

The proposal has faced skepticism from regional actors, especially ASEAN countries, who fear that such an alliance could increase economic tensions with China and disrupt their non-aligned position. Prime Minister Ishiba has since backed away from the proposal and did not mention it during his first overseas visit with ASEAN leaders earlier this month.

“There are two ways to read it,” said Robert Ward, Japan’s president and director of geoeconomics and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic studies (IISS) in an interview with UPI.

“One is to take it literally. It’s a complicated thing to do, not least because you’d need a constitutional change (in Japan)… The other thing is to look at it as some floating ideas of Ishiba’s… this idea not itself , but what it is trying to convey in terms of the future debate on Japan’s security. countries.'”

Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said in a statement earlier this month in response to Ishiba’s suggestion that Japan “often exaggerates the non-existent ‘China threat’ to distract the international community from its own military expansion.”

China’s military exercises earlier this month encircled Taiwansetting a record for the highest number of Chinese military aircraft crossing the sensitive median line of the Taiwan Strait, while Chinese coast guard vessels intentionally collided with Philippine vessels during maritime time. the distances at the beginning of this year. Japan and its regional allies are concerned that China’s threats to the region are far from “overblown” and part of a larger normalization of progressive intrusions into the region.

“We are facing a post-peak globalization planet that is now essentially operating under the new rules of the game,” said Mike Studeman, national security fellow at MITER and former rear admiral and commander of the US Office of Naval Intelligence. to a foreign correspondents. Club of Japan (FCCJ) press conference on October 25.

“When a country of this size becomes very zero-sum and mercantilist, then it has very strong repercussions for many other countries that are interdependent.”

However, one effect of this has been the recent doubling of Japanese defense spending proposals that would have seemed unthinkable in the recent past. While there is skepticism about the proposed timeline, Japan’s latest national security strategy, published in 2022announced an increase in military spending to 2% of GDP. While on par with proposed military spending for NATO members, this may put Japan on track to become the world’s third-largest military. However, constitutional limitations prevent this from being called “military” and would further restrict its offensive capabilities. The weakening yen is another obstacle that could prevent many of Japan’s defense ambitions from being realized.

While an “Asian NATO” might be a bridge too far, a host of smaller formal and informal defense alliances already exist in Asia and are expanding in addition to the region’s many half-hearted commercial cooperation agreements on balancing China’s influence. . The Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), created in July, is one example, allowing Japanese forces to deploy to the Philippines for joint military exercises. Japan has also signed RAA agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom.

The Quad (an informal alliance between the US, Japan, Australia and India) meets frequently to discuss defense and security in the Asia-Pacific region. There was support for the idea that this alliance should be expanded into a “Quint” or a “Quad Plus” to include South Korea. South Korean President Yoon has signaled in the past that South Korea would accept an invitation if one were made.

“What you have now are these groupings, many laterals, some of them more formal than others,” says Ward.

“The beauty of them is that you can connect like-minded countries together on specific issues and address specific strategic issues in a local way, whereas if you try to connect everyone, you’ll never reach an agreement.”

An “Asian NATO” may not be possible given the geopolitical diversity of the Asia-Pacific. However, the diversity of ideas in Asia about how to manage Chinese aggression has actually acted as a multiplier, creating a broad spectrum of alliances and approaches that make managing the balancing forces facing China far more complex.

“China would like to be able to deal with these things only bilaterally, where they retain all their advantages,” says Studeman. “This is a time when many states must work together as a coalition.”