Russia: Another threat after the war in Ukraine? You better believe

“No illusions, gentlemen!” No breathing room for NATO after Ukraine ceasefire: The quote referred to in the subtitle on the left, originally a response by Czar Alexander II to Polish nobles asking him about the prospects of a softer line on Poland within the Russian Empire, could serve as a motto for NATO- Russia after the war in Ukraine. , applicable regardless of the arrangements regarding the conditions for the termination of the conflict. One can hardly see the premises for a substantial change in Russia’s foreign policy outlook, in contrast to clear signs of the opposite trend.

As the war in Ukraine continues, NATO member states face hostile Russian acts under the threshold of war. It’s about psiops: disinformation campaignselectoral interference, instrumentalized migration, and military exercises close to NATO territory. Not to mention, they include trespassing Russian missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), subversion, cyber attacksand GPS jamming. Such acts, due to their cheapness, efficiency and plausible deniability, are likely to compensate Russia for its relative. decline in military power as a result of equipment losses in Ukraine.

It is nothing new, rather the same as what the Russian secret services are well known for. But this will certainly require building collective resilience by NATO member states and like-minded countries in a more systemic, coherent and consistent way than ever before. This is not just an outlook for the future, but rather an extrapolation of the increasingly challenging reality NATO already faces.

Although only intelligence agencies are well informed enough to assess whether the risk of NATO-Russia military confrontation was still real after February 24, 2022, since obvious “smoke weapons” are few, it is unlikely to increase immediately after war, given the associated loss of Russian military assets and much of Ukraine remaining, in all likelihood, a NATO buffer zone.

This does not mean, however, that there is no longer a need to maintain robust deterrence capabilities, particularly on the Eastern Flank. The unfolding of the war in Ukraine has confirmed the worst fears of both NATO member states, at least some of them, and Russia. Statements about Russian imperialism, hostility and brutality found conclusive evidence. Making any arrangements with an actor that deliberately violates agreed rules, such as the basic principles of UN Charter or international humanitarian law indicates that these norms must be based on something more than the good will of the contracting parties.

On the other hand, in response to its hostile actions, Russia received military reinforcement on NATO’s eastern flank, further alliance expansion and “most significant and immediate threat” status, as called in The 2022 strategic concept. This could be considered a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the Kremlin has used anti-NATO narratives for nearly two decades. Deep mutual mistrust is therefore expected to last long after the war.

But many factors that may determine postwar stability in NATO-Russia relations lie beyond Russia and Ukraine. Domestic political dynamics in NATO member states may vary in their willingness to cooperate with Russia, particularly when similar political groups growing in influence in almost all of them.

The cynical “pragmatism” or rather their “fake it until you make it” approach of such current or future leaders could establish a new tranquility in these relations to the detriment of the most threatened states. Moscow is surely waiting for the divisions within NATO to exploit them for its political goals. Needless to say, that’s what it’s all about possible American isolationism in particular. The eastern flank will certainly experience direct consequences, which would mean many kinds of Russian provocations. The situation in third countries such as Moldavia, Belarus, Georgiaand Armenia given their importance as Russian military staging areas, it is also notable as being among the potential stabilizing or destabilizing factors after the war at the regional level.

The end of the war in Ukraine will certainly create a new strategic situation for NATO, requiring an adjusted approach with the old policy models discarded. Regardless of how the internal dynamics of the member states will be, the post-war reality will require new tools to manage. Given the nature of the threat, this is an opportunity for NATO and the EU to find a functional division of responsibilities with NATO as the basis for collective defense and deterrence tasks and for the EU to address non-military security challengesincluding cyber security, hybrid threats, instrumentalized migration or energy policy, along with a developing European defense industrial base. The multidimensional resilience of the West is the key to stability in Europe once the war in Ukraine ends.

About the author:

Piotr Sledź is an assistant professor at the University of Warsaw (Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies). His research concerns armed conflict, arms control, the defense industry and the EU’s common security and defense policy.

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